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Note

Institutionalization of Juveniles:
What Process is Due?
Parham v. J.R.,

-

U.S. -,
I.

A.

99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979)

INTRODUCTION

The Facts of Parham

In Parham v. J.R.,' the Supreme Court established minimum
due process safeguards for minors committed to state mental institutions by procedures initiated by their parents or guardians. The
class action 2 suit was brought in the district court 3 by the minors
JL. and J.R., who requested declaratory and injunctive relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. J.R., who was thirteen at the time the suit
was filed, had been removed from his home by a juvenile court
only a few months after his birth because of severe parental neglect. By the age of eight, he had been placed in a total of seven
different foster homes. J.R.'s seventh set of foster parents requested his removal from their home because of his "abnormal behavior."' 4 Apparently unable to find adoptive parents for J.R., the
Georgia Department of Family and Children Services applied for
his admission to a state mental hospital. The hospital personnel
admitted J.R., finding him to be mentally ill and diagnosing his
condition as "borderline mental retardation" 5 and "unsocialized,
'6
aggressive reaction of childhood."
After nearly three years of hospitalization, hospital personnel
requested that the Department of Family and Children Services
1. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
2. The class certified by the district court consisted of "all persons younger than
18 years of age now or hereafter received by any defendant for observation
and diagnosis and/or detained for care and treatment at any 'facility' within
the State of Georgia"...... GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971). J.L. v. Parham,
412 F. Supp. 112, 117 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd and remandedsub. nom., Parham
v. J.Rl, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
3. J.L. v. Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd and remanded sub.
nom., Parham v. J.R., - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
4. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
5. 412 F. Supp. at 117.

6. Id.
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find a long-term foster home or adoptive home for J.R. because of
their feeling that continued institutionalization would cause J.R. to
regress, and their fear that absent an appropriate placement, J.R.
might become "a permanently institutionalized child.' 7 Two years
later, a foster home had not been obtained for J.R. He subsequently filed suit, "requesting an order of the court
placing him in a less
'8
drastic environment suitable to his needs.
J.L, was taken to a state mental hospital by his mother and
step-father in 1970 at the age of six. He was admitted by hospital
personnel who found him mentally ill, diagnosing his condition as
a "hyperkinetic reaction of childhood."'9 J.L.'s parents agreed to
participate in a family therapy program under which the child was
allowed to go home for short stays. However, the parents requested that the program be discontinued after several months.
After J.L. had been institutionalized for about two years, he was
discharged to his mother. 10 He was returned ten days later and
readmitted because "the parents found they were unable to control J.L. to their satisfaction which created family stress."" In
1973, hospital personnel informed the Department of Family and
Children Services that J.L. should be removed from confinement
and placed in "specialized foster care."'1 2 The department, in turn,
indicated that it could not pay for such care unless J L. was eligible
for federal funds.' 3 J.L. was not eligible, thus the specialized foster
care was not obtained. J.L. was still confined to the mental hospital when he filed suit in 1975 requesting suitable placement in a
less drastic environment. 14
B. The Decision
The statute under which JMR. and J.L. were committed governs
the voluntary admission of patients to state mental hospitals.' 5
The superintendent of any facility is authorized to receive for observation and diagnosis any person under eighteen years of age for
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

- U.S. -- 99 S.Ct. at 2498.
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
412 F. Supp. at 117.
Id.
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2497.
Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
412 F. Supp. at 117.
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971). The statutes of most states allow a parent to
place his child in a mental hospital subject only to the approval of the admitting physician or hospital administrator. For a listing of state statutes with
such provisions, see Ellis, Volunteering Children: ParentalCommitment of
Minors to Mental Institutions,62 CALL REV. 840, n.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Volunteering Children].
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whom application is made by parent or guardian. 16 If the individual shows "evidence of mental illness" and is found to be "suitable
for treatment," he may be detained for care and treatment.17 The
superintendent is obliged to discharge patients who recover or for
whom the undesirability of further hospitalization is demonstrated
by sufficient improvement. 18 In addition, voluntary patients and
their representatives have the right to apply for discharge.' 9 The
superintendent must ordinarily grant the application unless the
patient is dangerous to himself or others, in which case proceedings for involuntary hospitalization must be initiated. 20 However,
in the case of a minor admitted upon application of his parent or
may be
guardian, his release prior to reaching the age of majority
21
conditioned upon the consent of his parent or guardian.
J.R. and J.L. attacked the constitutionality of this statutory
scheme as applied to minors, claiming that it deprived them of liberty without a meaningful opportunity to be heard, thus violating
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 22 The state
argued that the mental health care system was designed merely to
assist parents in their traditional parental duties, and that the hospitalization of minors was merely the acceptance of state-provided
care by the parent on behalf of his child. 23 Furthermore, the state
argued that the child is sufficiently protected upon admission by
his parents and by the professional judgment of the admitting physician; and that during the course of hospitalization, he is protected by the superintendent's continuing duty to discharge
patients who have recovered or who have improved sufficiently
24
that the superintendent deems hospitalization undesirable.
A three-judge district court held that the voluntary commitment statute was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs' class
of juveniles and enjoined its further use by state officials and employees. 25 The court was not persuaded that parental involvement
in the commitment process adequately protected the interests of
the child, since the decision to seek commitment is often a product
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971).

Id.
Id. § 88-503.2.
Id. § 88-503.3.
Id.
Id.
412 F. Supp. at 118. The plaintiffs did not question nor did the court consider
the constitutional adequacy of the requisite standard for commitment under
the statute, i.e., showing evidence of mental illness and suitability for treatment. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 140.
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of family pathology. 26 The court noted that mental institutions are
still viewed by many as "dumping grounds" for unwanted children.27 Furthermore the court held as inadequate whatever additional protection might result from screening by the admitting
physician. The inadequacy was said to be due in part to the inexactitude of psychiatry 28 and the unavailability of less restrictive alternatives to confinement. 29 The court bolstered its conclusion by
citing a report prepared by Georgia's Study Commission on
Mental Health Services for Children and Youth.3 0 After closely
scrutinizing the Georgia mental health care system for six months,
the Commission observed that "more than half of the hospitalized
children and youth would not need hospitalization if other forms of
care were available .... ",31 Accompanying the court's remedy
was an order directing the defendants to provide
non-hospital fa32
cilities where appropriate, at state expense.
33
The decision of the district court was reversed on appeal.
While the Supreme Court recognized that a child has a "substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical
treatment" 34 the Court also stressed the liberty interests of parents in maintaining their authority over the upbringing of their
children, including the "high duty" to recognize symptoms and
seek medical treatment.35 The Court concluded that the parents
should retain a substantial, if not dominant, role in the commitment decision, but that the risk to the child's interest in remaining
free from unnecessary incarceration precluded allowing the parents absolute and unreviewable discretion. In striking a balance
between the competing interests of parent and child, as well as the
state interest in avoiding undue financial and administrative burdens, the Court held that due process required an independent
evaluation by a staff physician.3 6 The physician, cast in the role of
a "neutral factfinder," must have authority to refuse to admit any
child not satisfying medical admission standards. 3 7 The evaluation
need not amount to a formal or quasi-formal hearing, for "due
process is not violated by use of informal traditional medical inves26. Id. at 133.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id. at 139.
Parham v. J.R., - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
Id. at-, 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
Id. at-, 99 S.Ct. at 2504-05.
Id. at-, 99 S.Ct. at 2506-07.
Id.
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tigative techniques. ' '38
The Parham decision is the most recent application of a threefactor balancing approach to due process which has evolved in recent Supreme Court opinions. 39 The following section outlines the
specific interests involved when this approach is applied to voluntary juvenile commitment. The nature of the process which reflects the appropriate balancing of these interests 4o and the
applicability in this area of the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative 4 ' are the subjects of subsequent sections.
11.
A.

DEFINING THE INTERESTS

Private Interests-Parent and Child

In Mathews v. Eldridge,42 the Supreme Court abstracted from
earlier decisions 43 three factors which ordinarily must be considered in determining the specific dictates of due process in a given
case:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 4 4

It is now well-settled that "constitutional rights do not mature
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority." 45 The right of minors to freedom of expression under the first amendment has been recognized by the
Supreme Court,46 as has the right not to be placed twice in jeop38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2507.
See text accompanying notes 42-44 infra.
See text accompanying notes 141-61 infra.
See text accompanying notes 162-87 infra.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
The Court relied primarily on the following four cases: Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134 (1974) (government employee's property interest in continued
employment and interest in not being stigmatized balanced against the right
of the Civil Service reasonably to regulate employee job-related activities);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolee's limited liberty interest balanced against state's interests in preventing antisocial acts and restoring parolee to useful life); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare recipients'
property interest in continued benefits balanced against state interest in conserving fiscal and administrative resources); Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (property interest of worker in
continued employment at specific governmental installation balanced against
governmental security interest and right to discretion in exercising proprietary functions).
44 424 U.S. at 335.
45. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
46. Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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ardy for the same offense in state criminal proceedings. 47 The liberty interest of minors was recognized by the Supreme Court over
fifty years ago. 48 More recent cases have made it clear that a minor's liberty interest is entitled to the protections of due process
whenever the state itself initiates actions imposing bodily restraints 49 or seriously damaging the minor's reputation.50
In addition, the minor has an interest in avoiding the serious
and well-documented dangers that unnecessary institutionalization poses to his mental health.5 1 As one commentator pointed
out, "nearly all long-term hospital patients exhibit flatness of response, withdrawal, muteness, and loss of motivation. Once believed to be part of the degenerative process of mental illness,
these phenomena are now universally accepted-even by public
hospital administrators-as responses to hospitalization itself
....

-52 Thus, the minor's liberty interest is not limited to avoid-

ing physical restraint, but in avoiding the potentially negative impact of institutional conditions. 53
The liberty interest of a minor is not coextensive with that of an
adult. The state has within its police power a broader authority
over the activities of children than it has over adults. 54 In order to
protect the welfare of children, states may permissibly regulate
such activities as child labor 55 and the obtaining of sex-related material by minors5 6 even where such a statute would be unconstitutional if applicable to all persons generally. 57 Thus, a minor has
only a conditional liberty interest, but it is one which cannot be
abridged by the state arbitrarily and without due process of law.58
The Parham Court acknowledged that a child "has a substan47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id.; Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
See, e.g., R. BARTON, INSTrrUTIONAL NEUROSIS (3d ed. 1976); R. CANCRO, THE
SCHIZOPHRENIC REACTIONS: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT, HOSPITAL TREATMENT, AND CURRENT RESEARCH (1969); D. VAIL, DEHUMANIZATION AND THE INSTITUTIONAL CAREER (1966); J. WING & G. BROWN, INSTITuTIONALISM AND

SCHIZOPHRENIA (1970).
52. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally l
Practical
Guides and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1127 (1972)

[hereinafter cited as Alternatives to Commitment].
53. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (discussing the unpleasant conditions to
which a juvenile would be exposed upon "therapeutic" incarceration in an
"Industrial School" for delinquency).
54. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944)
55. Id.
56. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
57. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 167.
58. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(holding that a parolee, who remains in the custody of the state, nevertheless
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tial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical
treatment... ."-59 This claim was not disputed by the state. 60 The
Court, however, was not clear with respect to the minor's liberty
interest in avoiding the stigma of erroneous labeling, stating only
that it would assume, without deciding,
that the juvenile had a pro61
tectible interest in his reputation.
With respect to that portion of the plaintiffs' class 62 who were
not wards of the state at the time the commitment process was
initiated, the analysis of private interests must also include the interests of the children's parents. Parental authority has traditionally been protected against state action which "unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control."63 The
major cases establishing this parental interest involved challenges,
frequently on religious grounds, to state statutes regulating the nature,6 content, 65 and duration 66 of mandatory public education.
This parental right does not extend, however, to actions which
jeopardize the physical health of the child,6 7 prevent his wellrounded growth into a mature citizen, 68 or carry the potential of
69
making the child a burden to society.
The Parham Court relied on this area of traditionally protected
parental authority and the common law presumption that parents
act in the best interests of their children to conclude that parents
should retain "a substantial, if not the dominant role" in deciding if
their child requires institutionalization.7 0

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.

66.

has a conditional liberty interest which he cannot be made to forfeit absent
the requirements of procedural due process).
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2503.
Id.
Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2503-04.
See note 2 supra.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
Id. (holding unconstitutional a statute mandating compulsory attendance at
public schools which did not allow parents the option of sending their children to private or parochial schools).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a statute prohibiting
the teaching of foreign languages in public schools); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S.
404 (1923) (also invalidating a statute prohibiting teaching of foreign languages).
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (striking down a statute requiring attendance at public schools until age eighteen, as applied to Amish children

who receive vocational training in Amish community).
67. E.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962); Wallace v. Labrenz, 411
Ill.
618, 104 N.E 2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952). See generally Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALF UJ.645 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ParentalAutonomy].
68. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 168 (1944).
69. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
70. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2505.
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Thus, the Court relied rather uncritically on a line of cases involving litigation between parents and state to mark out the scope
of parental authority as against the child. As pointed out by Justice Douglas, dissenting in part to the Court's opinion in Wisconsin
v. Yoder,71 "we have in the past analyzed similar conflicts between
parent and State with little regard for the views of the child ....
Recent cases, however, have clearly held that the children themselves have constitutionally protectible interests. '72 The Court in
Yoder specifically refrained from deciding if the state could legitimately assert its authority to supervene parental autonomy on behalf of children asserting an independent constitutional right.7 3 In
reserving this issue while simultaneously deciding the issue of parental authority as between parent and state, the Court at least
acknowledged that the issues and interests involved are not identical.
In Planned Parenthoodof Missouri v. Danforth,74 the Supreme
Court was finally presented with a case wherein parental authority
came into direct conflict with a minor child's independent assertion of a constitutional right. A Missouri statute required unmarried women under the age of eighteen to obtain parental consent
as a precondition to seeking an abortion.7 5 The state defended the
statute by pointing out that a state may properly subject minors to
more severe restrictions than it can impose on adults. 76 Furthermore, the state argued, the statute serves the purpose of strengthening the family unit and safeguarding parental autonomy.7 7 The
Court was not persuaded that the statute would effectively serve
these purposes "where the minor and the nonconsenting parent
are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family structure. '78 Unable to find
any significant state interest served by conditioning an abortion on
parental consent, the Court held the provision to be unconstitutional.7 9 The child's independent liberty right prevailed in the absence of a significant counterveiling state interest.
The Danforth holding marks a significant departure from the
common law rule granting parents the power to make medical decisions for their children.8 0 Previous exceptions had been carved
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
Id. at 231.
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
Mo. ANN.STAT. § 188.020(4) (Vernon Supp. 1979).
428 U.S. at 72-75.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
See generally Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decision-Making
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out where preservation of the child's life or public health and
safety required the child to undergo a medical procedure, and the
parent, for religious reasons or because of simple neglect, failed to
give consent.81 In such cases, the state has generally been held to
have the power to supervene parental autonomy and give consent
for the treatment. However, the opinion of the child "is rarely
mentioned, apparently because it is not known or not considered
relevant, '8 2 and the parent was generally considered to have the
83
authority to order medical care over the child's objection.
Professor Bennett, in discussing the allocation of child-care decision-making authority in the context of abortions for minors,
points out that "surely the individual's interest in a medical care
decision diminishes as the medical considerations dominate and
provide a clear answer. On the other hand, as a decision becomes
medically or personally controversial, the individual's interest in
making it for himself increases. '84 The "long-term non-health consequences" of the decision also figure prominently in Bennett's
analysis.85 Because long-term consequences will continue to affect
the child after his emancipation at majority, he has a greater interest in making the controversial decision himself.
The Danforth decision is in accord with this analysis, because
abortion involves a "personally controversial" decision with very
significant long-range non-health consequences. Commitment to a
mental institution also involves a personally and medically 86 controversial decision. The long-range non-health considerations are
at the least very significant (e.g., stigmatization 87 ) and can be overwhelming as in the case of life-long commitment. Thus, by this
analysis, juvenile commitment should be at least as appropriate an
area as abortion in which to recognize the child's independent interest.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Authority: A Suggested Interest Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Child Medical Care]; ParentalAutonomy, supra note 67.
See id.; 30 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1953).
Child Medical Care, supra note 80, at 311.
See, e.g., Friedrichsen v. Niemotka, 71 N.J. Super. 398, 177 A2d 58 (1962); Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S.E.785 (1921).
Child Medical Care,supra note 80, at 311.
Id.
See, e.g., Szasz, The Child as Involuntary Mental Patient: The Threat of Child
Therapy to the Child's Dignity, Privacy, and Self-Esteem, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1005 (1977).
Research on the social effects of stigmatization reveals its negative impact in
such important areas as employment and interpersonal relations. See, e.g.,
Farina & Ring, The Influence of PerceivedMental Illness on InterpersonalRelations, 70 J. ABNORMAL PSYCH. 47 (196); Lanny, Social Consequences of
MentalIllness, 30 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 450 (1966); Miller & Dawson, Effects of
Stigma on Re-employment of Ex-mental Patients, 49 MENTAL HYGIENE 281

(1965).
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In Parham,the Court did not assume, as it did in Danforth,that
the child's liberty interest was entitled to vindication absent significant counterveiling interests. The Parham Court assumed that
the scope of parental authority, as derived from the parent-state
line of cases 88 gives the parent the right to decide for the child in
the first instance: "The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization
...
does not diminish the parents' authority to decide what is best
for the child."89 The Court distinguished Danforth, arguing that it
was the grant of an absolute parental veto power which made the
abortion statute constitutionally unsound, and that parents do not,
under the Georgia commitment statute, have an absolute power to
commit their children. 90 However, this distinction ignores the fundamental teaching of Danforth. It is not merely the degree of
power granted to the parent which is crucial; the significance of
Danforth is that supervention of the child's independent constitutional liberty interest requires adequate justification in the first instance, 91 92at least where the minor is of sufficient age and
maturity.
B. Risk of Error and Value of Additional Safeguards
Under the Georgia voluntary commitment statute, it is the parent or guardian who makes the initial decision to initiate the commitment process for his minor child.93 This decision may be
influenced by a number of factors other than the need of the child
for institutional care. A countercultural lifestyle may be viewed
incorrectly by parents as evidence of psychopathology; 94 other behavior which is merely unconventional may cause parents to seek
commitment out of irritation or embarrassment. 95 The interests of
other children in the family may take precedence over what is best
88. See notes 60-66 & accompanying text supra.
89. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2505.

90. Id.
91. "The fault with [the statute] is that it imposes a special-consent provision,
exercisable by a person other than the woman and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termination of her pregnancy and does so without a sufficient justificationfor the restriction." 428 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).
92. The Court in Danforth did not indicate at what age or level of maturity the
state may appropriately curtail the minor's liberty; it held only that the age of
eighteen, the same age limit involved in the Parham commitment statute,
was impermissibly restrictive. 428 U.S. at 72-75. Cf. In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d
921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977) (holding that fourteen year old
juvenile is entitled independently to assert right to due process in commit-

ment proceedings).
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971).
94. Volunteering Children, supra note 15.
95. Id.
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for the "disturbed" child. 96 The presentation of the child for commitment may be a result of pathology on the part of the parent or
of the entire family, or it may be an attempt to avoid recognition of
larger family problems.97 The parent may be reacting to community pressure to institutionalize the child.98 Finally, since the decision is often made during a time of great family stress, the
alternatives to institutionalization may not receive adequate consideration. 99
In light of these extraneous influences on the parental decision
to seek commitment, and the lack of any particular psychiatric or
psychological expertise on the part of the parent, it would seem
reasonable to conclude that the decision carries a very substantial
risk of error. The risk would not appear to be any less substantial
in the case of children who are wards of the state; the placement
decision may turn on administrative or financial considerations 10 0
or the attractiveness of the child to potential foster parents. 01'
After the decision to seek commitment has been made by the
parent or guardian, the child is taken to the mental health facility
and examined by the admitting physician for "evidence of mental
illness" and to see if he is "suitable for treatment.' 02 This additional safeguard of an independent psychiatric evaluation will presumably reduce, to some extent, the risk of error present in the
initial decision to seek commitment. The Parham Court expressed
confidence in "informal traditional medical investigative techniques.' 03 In fact, the Court held that one independent psychiatric evaluation is the only check required by due process on the
parent's or guardian's decision to seek commitment. 104 While the
96. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded-Some CriticalIssues, 7 FAM.

L. Q. 1, 9-10 (1973).
97. Vogel & Bell, The EmotionallyDisturbedChild as the Family Scapegoa in A
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO THE FAmm.y 382-97 (N. Bell & E. Vogel eds., rev. ed.
1968).
98. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30, 39
(1978), rev'd and remanded, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
99. 459 F. Supp. at 39-40; Volunteering Children, supra note 15, at 850-52.
100. Despite repeated requests by hospital personnel to remove J.R. from the institution to a less restrictive setting, the state agency allowed J.R. to remain
in confinement, 412 F. Supp. at 117. J.L. apparently remained in hospital confinement only because he was not eligible to receive federal funds. Id.
101. Id. at 134-35.
102. GA. STAT. ANN. § 88-503.1 (1971).
103. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2507.
104. Id. at -- , 99 S. Ct. at 2506-13.
It is not necessary that the deciding physician conduct a formal or
Due process is not violated by use of inquasi-formal hearing ....
The mode
formal traditional medical investigative techniques ....
and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business
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Court acknowledged the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis,

05

the

opinion did not attempt to determine the magnitude of the risk of
error. Such an inquiry would seem crucial in determining the

probable value of this procedural safeguard.
The Supreme Court very recently noted that "psychiatric diagnosis ... is to a large extent based on medical 'impressions' drawn
from subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the

diagnostician. This process often makes it very difficult for the expert physician to offer definite conclusions about any particular patient."' 06 Empirical studies shed some light on the degree of
uncertainty involved in the psychiatric diagnosis. 0 7 Ennis and
Litwack made a comprehensive survey of the professional literature evaluating the validity and reliability of psychiatric judgments.10 8 They found that the empirical investigations revealed
that psychiatrists were frequently unable to agree on even very
broad diagnostic categorizations of patients, and that "they disagree more often than not on more specific diagnoses ....

1109

These authors also reviewed a number of studies which have attempted to determine the accuracy with which psychiatrists can
determine whether a patient needs to be institutionalized.
In each study individuals who had been examined in a hospital admission

ward and found to require full-time hospitalization and treatment were
randomly divided into two groups. One group was hospitalized and the
other was treated in the community or in a day hospital or on an outpatient basis. Over a substantial period of time, only a few of the community
patients failed to get along in the community and had to be hospitalized.

In fact, the community patients recovered faster than the hospitalized patients ....

105.
106.

107.

108.
109.
110.

110

of judges. What is best for the child is an individual medical decision
that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each case.
Id. at-,
99 S. Ct. at 2507.
Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2507.
Addington v. Texas, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 1804,1811 (1979). See also O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). "The Court appropriately takes notice at the
uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis and therapy, and the reported cases are
replete with evidence of the divergence of medical opinion in this vexing
area." Id. at 579 (Berger, C. J., concurring).
See, e.g., Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock & Erbaugh, Reliability of Psychiatric
Diagnosis: A Study of Consistency of ClinicalJudgments and Ratings, 119
AM. J. PSYCH. 351 (1962); Schmidt & Fonda, The Reliability of PsychiatricDiagnosis: A New Look, 52 J. OF ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCH. 262 (1956); Stoller
& Geertsma, The Consistency of Psychiatrists'ClinicalJudgments, 137 J. OF
NERvous AND MENTAL DISEASES 58 (1963). See generally J. ZisxIN, COPING
WTrrH PsYcHIATRIc AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (2d ed. 1975).
Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom,62 CAL. I REV. 693 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Psychiatric Expertise].
Id. at 708 (emphasis added).
Id. at 718.
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On the basis of these and many other studies, Ennis and Litwack
conclude that psychiatric judgments of whether to commit have
not been shown to be substantially more reliable or valid than
judgments based on the flip of a coin."'
These authors are not alone in concluding that psychiatric diagnosis contains a very high risk of error.1 1 2 Perhaps the most vivid
illustration of the dangers of psychiatric misdiagnosis was the famous study conducted by Rosenhan"1 3 in which eight sane persons
(three psychologists, a pediatrician, a psychiatrist, a painter, a
housewife, and a graduate student in psychology) gained admission to twelve mental hospitals of varying reputations and locations across the country. In order to gain admission, the
"pseudopatients" reported hearing voices which they thought
were saying "empty," "hollow," or "thud". Beyond alleging these
symptoms and falsifying name and vocation, the pseudopatients
gave truthful life histories and accurately answered all questions,
behaving in a "normal" and cooperative manner. All were found to
be mentally ill and were admitted. Over the course of their hospitalization, which lasted anywhere from seven to fifty-two days,
none of the pseudopatients was detected. They were released not
on the basis of being sane or cured, but because their illness was
"in remission." On hearing these findings, the staff of another
mental hospital expressed doubt that such a phenomenon could
occur at their facility. The staff was informed that over the next
three months, one or more pseudopatients would attempt to gain
admission to this hospital. During this period, forty-one patients
were identified, with a high degree of confidence, as pseudopatients by at least one member of the staff. In fact, no pseudopatients had presented themselves. Rosenhan concludes that "one
thing is certain: any diagnostic process that lends itself so readily
1 14
to massive errors of this sort cannot be a very reliable one."
In the face of such evidence establishing the unreliability of
psychiatric diagnosis, the value of an independent psychiatric
evaluation as a check on the parent's or guardian's initial decision
to commit would seem to be dubious at best."15 While the Parham
111. Id. at 743.
112. See, e.g., note 107 supra;Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and PsychiatricTestimony: The Fallibilityof the Doctrineof Immaculate
Perception,6 CAP. U. L REv. 11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as PsychiatricTestimony] (reviewing the research literature and concluding that psychiatry
lacks precise definitions which can be consistently applied).
113. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250 (1973).
114. Id. at 252.
115. Quoting from the deposition of Dr. John P. Filley, Director, Child and Mental
Health Services for the state of Georgia, the district court said:
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Court acknowledged that the medical decision-making process is
not error-free," 6 it characterized misdiagnoses as "rare exceptions," and stated that "we are satisfied that an independent medical decision-making process... will protect children who should
not be admitted ....
,117 The relevant research does not justify
this conclusion. Furthermore, the study undertaken at the request
of Georgia's Director of the Division of Mental Health" 8 indicated
that more than half of the institutionalized juveniles in that state's
mental hospitals did not require hospitalization. 119 The independent psychiatric evaluation is an effective safeguard neither in the-

ory nor in practice.
The ParhamCourt discussed the sufficiency of formal or quasi120
It is
formal hearings with regard to due process requirements.
clear that such hearings have not in all cases proven to be effective
safeguards against erroneous commitment.' 2 1 The shortcomings
most frequently cited are the short duration typical of such hearings, 122 the overreliance on expert testimony, 123 and the failure of
124
counsel adequately to defend the prospective patient's rights.
These inadequacies have frequently resulted in "the allocation of
effective decision-making to the medical, more particularly the
psychiatric, profession with the legal process and the attorney assuming a ceremonial function."12
These considerations led the Supreme Court in Parhamto con-

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

123.
124.
125.

In sum and substance Dr. Filley testified that the decision to hospitalize for care and treatment comes about in the following manner.
"The parent may come in saying, 'I can't handle it any more; do
something'; And, they say at the hospital or it might be the psychiatrist who says, 'I think hospitalization is indicated.' The parent would
agree and that would decide it."
412 F. Supp. at 134.
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2509.
Id.
See text accompanying note 31 supra.
412 F. Supp. at 122.
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2506-09.
See, e.g., Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, PsychiatricTestimony, supra note 112;
Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44 U. TEX. L. REV. 424 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Attorney's Function].
See Albers & Pasewark, Involuntary Hospitalization" Surrenderat the Courthouse, 2 Am. J. CoMneTmrrY PSYCH. 287 (1974) (mean time for hearings was 9.2
minutes); Cohen, Attorney's Function,supra note 114 (40 hearings were conducted in a total of 75 minutes); Miller & Schwartz, County Lunacy Commission Hearings: Some Observations of Commitment to a State Mental
Hospital,14 Soc. PROB. 26 (1966) (mean hearing time of 4.4 minutes).
See PsychiatricTestimony, supra note 112; PsychiatricExpertise,supra note
102.
See Attorney's Function,supra note 121; Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil
Commitment Proceedings: Emerging Problems, 62 CAT. L REV. 816 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Role of Counsel].
Attorney's Function,supra note 121, at 424-25.
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elude that a formal judicial-type hearing would not significantly reduce the risk of erroneous commitment. 126 This conclusion is very
difficult to reconcile with the holding of Addington v. Texas,127 decided by the Supreme Court last year. The issue in that case was
the standard of proof constitutionally required in an adult civil
commitment hearing. The Court held that something beyond the
preponderance of the evidence standard was required by due process, because "[t]he individual should not be asked to share
equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to
the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the
state... ."128 Thus, the Addington Court held that a hearing employing the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof significantly reduces the risk of erroneous commitment as compared to a
hearing using a preponderance of the evidence standard. This implies that an appropriately structured hearing can be of significant
value in reducing the risks of error.
While it is clear that commitment hearings have very often
been inadequate as procedural safeguards, 129 it is not clear that
they could not be made effective. The problem has been recognized in the academic literature; prominent among the suggestions
offered are clarifying the role and increasing the effectiveness of
council, 30 and limiting or even excluding expert psychiatric testimony.131 The Parham Court simply discounted the possibility that
hearings might significantly reduce the risk of erroneous commitment, apparently without considering the potential efficacy of
132
these modifications.
C.

Governmental Interests

Several distinct interests of the state are affected by the commitment of juveniles to its mental institutions and by the nature of
the process by which this is accomplished. First, the state has an
interest in the future development of the child. 33 This implies
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2509.
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
Id. at--, 99 S. Ct. at 1810.
See notes 121-25 & accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counselfor PersonsFacing Civil
Commitment" A Survey, A Polemic, and a Proposal,45 Miss. LJ.43 (1974);
Attorney's Function, supra note 121; Role of Counsel, supra note 124 See
also Nemmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis.2d 276, 249 N.W.2d 573 (1977) (requiring "adversary counsel" in civil commitment proceedings).
131. See, e.g., PsychiatricExpertise,supra note 108, at 734-47. See also Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (discussing the propriety of
psychiatric experts testifying in conclusory terms in the context of the insanity defense).
132. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2508-09.
133. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (recognizing the physical and
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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both an interest in avoiding erroneous commitment and in providing appropriate care and treatment when needed, 1 4 and thus narrows down to an interest in ensuring accuracy of diagnosis.
Second, the state has an obvious financial interest in restricting
the use of its facilities to those genuinely in need of care. 135 Once
again, this interest is most directly served by procedures which
minimize erroneous commitments. Third, the state has an interest
in avoiding unduly burdensome procedures, not only because of
financial and administrative costs,

36

but also because of the unde-

sirability of placing unnecessary procedural obstacles in the way
of parents who might thereby be discouraged from seeking needed
help for their children. 13Finally,
the state has an interest in pre7
serving the family unit.
The Parham Court suggests that the state's interest in the family unit is best served by allowing the parent to have the major
voice in the commitment decision and thus avoiding the pitting 3of8
parent and child against each other as adversaries in a hearing.
It is argued that such a confrontation would adversely stress the
family relationship and make it more difficult for the parent to assist the child during and after treatment. 3 9 On the other hand, it
is the child who wishes to remain with the parents; they are the
ones seeking to have him removed from the family unit.14 0 The
Court in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth141 was not
persuaded that the interests of preserving the family unit were
served by a grant of authority where the conflict "already has fractured the family structure."' 42

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

mental health of a child, as well as his future ability to be self-supporting and
ability to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship as legitimate
state concerns); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (recognizing
that state has an interest in securing the well-rounded growth of young people against a wide range of dangers and restraints); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d
921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal Rptr. 298 (1977) (recognizing societal interest in
avoiding erroneous commitment of child based on nmisdiagnosis). Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S 471 (1972) (recognizing interest in state of having parolee restored to useful life and thus an interest in not allowing his parole to
be revoked on erroneous information).
See note 133 supra.
The State of Georgia estimated the annual cost of care in a state mental hospital to be $40,000 per child. 412 F. Supp. at 125-26.
E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) "[E]xperience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional
cost... would not be insubstantial." Id. at 347.
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2508.
Id.
See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d at 934, 569 P.2d at 1291, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
Id. at 75.
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While the state interests are diverse and perhaps even somewhat contradictory, it is clear that they would be served by reducing the risk of erroneous diagnosis and commitment. However, a
procedure which would accomplish this end at the cost of discouraging parents from seeking needed help for their children or by
pitting parents against children in an adversary proceeding would
arguably disserve state interests in the child and in the family unit.
An expensive or time consuming procedure would obviously disserve state fiscal interests.
HI. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
Once the interests of the parties involved have been defined,
and the probable value and costs of possible safeguards determined, the difficult task remains of balancing these factors and establishing the minimum requirements of due process. 14 3 The
balance struck in adult commitment and in juvenile delinquency
proceedings will provide useful analogies. In the case of adult involuntary civil commitment proceedings, where the interests and
risks closely parallel those of "voluntary" juvenile commitment
proceedings, it now seems virtually certain that due process requires a full adversarial hearing before a neutral tribunal. The
Court has mandated strict procedural safeguards in the analogous
area of quasi-criminal commitment; 14 4 at least a minority of Justices have read this case broadly enough to require the same protections in adult civil commitment cases. 145 Recently, the
Supreme Court has held that the standard of proof in an adult involuntary civil commitment proceeding must be more stringent
than a mere preponderance of the evidence because of the risks a
lesser standard would pose for erroneous commitment. 14 If due
process is not satisfied by a full and fair adversarial hearing employing the preponderance of evidence standard, it would seem
143. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976). See also note 43 supra.
144. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
145.
In the absence of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, adults
facing commitment to mental institutions are entitled to full and fair
adversarial hearings in which the necessity for their commitment is
established to the satisfaction of a neutral tribunal. At such hearings
they must be accorded the right to be present with counsel, have an
opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against
them], have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of
[their] own.
U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2516 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting) (quoting Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967)).
146. Addington v. Texas, - U.S. - 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
-
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that anything less than such a hearing would be afortiori unconstitutional.
In another line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that due
process requires strict procedural safeguards in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 147 With few exceptions, 148 juveniles now enjoy the same safeguards as adult criminal defendants. Although
these proceedings are nominally "civil" and their purpose is rehabilitative rather than punitive, the Court has refused to be
deceived by appearances and representations. 149 The ultimate effect on the juvenile, i.e., loss of liberty through incarceration and
stigmatization, is virtually the same as the effect of criminal proceedings on the adult offender. Since the same interests are at
stake, "it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in
the phrase 'due process.' "'so
The interests to be balanced and the risks of error in the three
contexts of "voluntary" civil commitment of juveniles, involuntary
civil commitment of adults, and juvenile delinquency proceedings,
are virtually identical in many respects. The individual has, in all
three cases, a liberty interest 151 in being free of unnecessary confinement and stigmatization. While it might be argued that a juvenile has only a conditional liberty interest, 52 and thus does not
require the full panoply of procedural safeguards afforded an adult
who is subject to commitment, this cannot be squared with the juvenile delinquency line of cases. Both the minor alleged to be
mentally ill and the minor alleged to be delinquent have only conditional liberty interests. The degree to which this interest is invaded by a finding of delinquency is substantially the same as the
degree of infringement attendant upon a finding of "mental illness" and "suitability for treatment." The net result is incarceration for treatment or rehabilitation in both cases. The justification
147. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring adequate notice, right to
counsel, retained or appointed, right against self-incrimination, right to confront and cross-examine witnesses); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)
(placing procedural restrictions on the power of juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction).
148. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (holding that due process
does not require jury trials in juvenile proceedings because of the potentially
damaging effects on juvenile offenders and juvenile courts). In Gault, the
Court refrained from deciding whether states must provide judicial review of
juvenile proceedings or a transcript of the hearings. 387 U.S. at 57-58.
149. See, e.g., the Court's characterization of the juvenile court process and rehabilitative treatment in Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-29.
150. Id. at 27-28.
151. See § III-A of text supra.
152. See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
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for the radical difference in procedural safeguards, therefore, cannot find its basis in either the nature of the interest subject to curtailment or the degree to which the interest is invaded.
The interests of the state 153 in conserving the administrative resources consumed in adversarial hearings and in restricting the
use of its costly rehabilitative facilities to those truly in need are
the same in all three contexts. The interest in the future development of its children should be no less for those labeled delinquent
than for those labeled mentally ill. The interest in preserving the
family unit might arguably be served by giving parents a prominent place in juvenile commitment proceedings. In addition, the
state might deem it unwise to place substantial procedural obstacles in the way of parents who might thereby be deterred from
seeking help for children who genuinely need institutional therapy. Since the state interests which might be asserted in justification of lesser procedural safeguards are inextricably tied to
they will be included in the discussion of that
parental interests
15 4
topic below.
The probable value of procedural safeguards in reducing the
155
risk of erroneous deprivations of liberty is, as previously stated,
another factor to be balanced in determining the requirements of
due process. The Parham Court expressed the belief that adversarial hearings would be of little or no value in reducing that
risk.156 In Addington, the Court concluded that because the issues
involved in a civil commitment proceeding were psychiatric in na57
ture, the reasonable doubt standard of proof was not required.
Psychiatric conclusions can rarely reach the level of certainty with
which the "straight-forward factual questions"'158 of a criminal or a
juvenile delinquency proceeding can be resolved. However, the
Court also held that the preponderance of the evidence standard
did not adequately protect the prospective patient from erroneous
commitment, and thus mandated a more restrictive standard. 159 If
the difference in risk entailed in the use of two different standards
of proof is constitutionally significant, it is hard to see how the
hearing itself is without value. Since the factual issues are essentially of a psychiatric nature in both adult and juvenile commitment proceedings, it would seem logical to conclude that an
adversarial hearing would be equally useful for reducing the risk
of error in both contexts.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See § rn-C of text supra.
See notes 157-61 infra.
See § I-B of text supra.
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2509.
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 1811.

158. Id.
159. Id. at -,

99 S. Ct. at 1810.
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The unique feature of juvenile commitment proceedings which
most convincingly distinguishes them from juvenile delinquency
and adult commitment proceedings is the involvement of the parent. While other factors were given some weight by the language
of Parham,the same factors were not considered of sufficient importance in adult commitment or juvenile delinquency proceedings to justify abandonment of full adversarial hearings. 60
Parham is thus best read as a strong endorsement of parental authority. This is in accord with the common law presumption that
parents act in the best interests of their children' 61 and the power
granted parents ordinarily to make medical decisions in the child's
16 2
behalf.
A number of considerations militate against positing parental
authority as a superordinate value in the context of juvenile commitment. As discussed above, many factors extraneous to the best
interests of the child may enter into the parental decision to seek
commitment. 63 In addition, when medical decisions substantially
impair a protected liberty interest of the child, it may be highly
inappropriate, as recognized in Danforth, to give parents a broad
grant of authority to make those decisions. 16 4
IV.

THE HIDDEN ISSUE-THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEAST
RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE

One important issue raised by the Parham case, but virtually
ignored in the Supreme Court opinion, is the applicability of the
doctrine of the least restrictive alternative to the commitment of
juveniles. The remedy prescribed by the district court in J.L. v.
Parham65 required the defendant state officials "to provide necessary physical resources and personnel for whatever non-hospital
facilities are deemed by them to be most appropriate for these children, and.., to place these children in such non-hospital facilities

as soon as reasonably appropriate.

. .

,166

It further required the

defendants to spend whatever state funds were reasonably necessary to provide these alternatives. 167 The usual due process inquiry examines only the nature of the proceeding in order to
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See text accompanying notes 141-56 supra.
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2504.
See text accompanying notes 80-86 supra.
See text accompanying notes 93-97 supra. See also Comment, "Voluntary"
Admission of Children to Mental Hospitals: A conflict of Interest Between
Parentand Child, 36 MD.L REV. 153 (1976).
See text accompanying notes 74-86 supra.
412 F. Supp. at 139-40.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 139-40. The court went so far as to specify the non-hospital alternatives
from which the defendants might choose. Id.
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determine if it adequately protects the various interests involved. 168 In going beyond this to consider the types of alternative
dispositions which must be made available to the decision-maker,
the court implicitly invoked the doctrine of the least restrictive al69
ternative.1
Simply stated, the doctrine holds that "governmental action
must not intrude upon constitutionally protected interests to a7 0deIt
gree greater than necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose."'
has been constitutionally applied to curb undue governmental intrusions in a variety of contexts.171 In the area of personal liberties, the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative has been
invoked, for example, to overturn anti-contraceptive legislation
which unnecessarily invaded the right to marital privacy, 172 and to
hold unconstitutional a law infringing unnecessarily on the right to
travel. 173 If the Constitution prohibits the intrusion on these personal liberties beyond the minimum necessary to achieve legitimate state ends, the same principle might arguably be applied to
prohibit unwarranted physical confinement. The Supreme Court
has recognized that commitment to a mental institution inevitably
curtailment of liberty"' 74 and affects "fundaentails a "massive
75
mental rights.'
The least restrictive alternative doctrine assumes, of course, the
existence of effective alternatives to the challenged state action. In
order to determine what constitutes an effective alternative, it 7is6
necessary first to determine the end served by the legislation.
In the case of commitment of juveniles to mental hospitals, the
state has an interest in the future development and well-being of
the child, his ability to discharge the duties and responsibilities of
citizenship, and his future ability to be self-supporting. 7 7 In short,
the state end will be served by any effective form of treatment
168. See, e.g., Greenhholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
169. See generally, Alternatives to Commitmen4 supra note 46; Hoffman & Foust,
Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search of Its
Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L REv. 1100 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Least Restrictive Treatment].
170. Least Restrictive Treatment, supra note 167, at 1101.
171. See generally Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process,80 HARv. L REV. 1463 (1967); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTA L. REv. 254 (1964); Note, Less
Drastic Means and the FirstAmendment, 78 YALE I.J. 464 (1969).
172. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
173. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
174. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
175. Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 113 (1966).
176. See, Alternatives to Commitmen4 supra note 52, at 1112-37.
177. See note 133 supra.
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which helps the child recover as fully as possible from his mental
illness or retardation. There is a growing body of research indicat-

ing that various forms of community treatment programs, e.g., outpatient care, day hospital care or home care services, are as effective or more effective than in-patient hospital care for a large percentage of patients. 17 8 These programs are not only much less
restrictive of the patients' liberty, but they also avoid the positive
79
dangers to mental health that institutionalization can pose.
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue of
whether the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative has application in the area of civil commitment. Some lower courts have
construed commitment statutes to require consideration of less restrictive alternatives, 8 0 while others have held that such consideration is constitutionally required.' 8 ' The Supreme Court has
several times hinted that the Constitution might require placement in the least restrictive setting. For example, in Jackson v. Indiana,18 2 the Court stated that "at the least, due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable
83
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."'
The issue was squarely before the Court on the appeal from a state
court decision in State v. Sanchez; 84 however, the appeal was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question."' 85 While this
technically constitutes a disposition on the merits and may be con178. J. HOENIG & M. HAMILTON,

179.
180.

181.

182.
183.

184.
185.

THE DESEGREGATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL

(1969);

B. PAsAmAmcK, F. SCARP=ri & S. Dnrz, SCHIZOPHRENICS IN THE COMMUNITY
(1967); Wilder, Levin & Zwerling, A Two-Year-Follow-Up EvaluationofAcute
PsychoticPatients Treated in a Day Hospital, 122 Am. J. PSYCH. 1095 (1966).
See note 51 supra.
See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (in which the court
applied the doctrine on statutory grounds but indicated that it is also constitutionally required); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Dixon v.
Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
See, e.g., Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439,452-53 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Davis
v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473
(1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Penn. 1971).
406 U.S. 715 (1972).
Id. at 738. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) where the
Court saidthe mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify a person
from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution. Moreover,
while the State may arguably confine a person to save him from
harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for raising
the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in freedom
on their own or with the help of family and friends ......
Id. at 575.
80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1970).
396 U.S. at 276.
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strued as foreclosing the issue, 186 many lower federal courts ap187
pear to be ignoring the dismissal.
The least restrictive alternative issue is of crucial importance in
the context of civil commitment of juveniles. In the case of juvenile wards of the state, many of whom will be unable to find adoptive parents 188 and will be forced to remain in state custody, the
restrictiveness of the setting will often be the only significant issue. Unlike adult commitment where the dispositional alternatives can be framed in black and white, i.e., incarceration or
release, many juveniles are faced only with different shades of
gray-a number of dispositions imposing various degrees of restraint. Where the issue was so clearly raised' 89 and the context so
apt, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court in Parham chose not
to address the question squarely, allowing it to be decided, as it
were, by default. 190
V.

CONCLUSION

The balancing of important competing values is a difficult task
at best, and it is made no easier when procedural structure must
be erected on the slippery foundation of our present psychiatric
knowledge. In the final analysis, a single psychiatric examination
does not afford a minor adequate protection against the substantial
risks of erroneous incarceration. Reflecting on this fundamental
concern, Justice Brandeis stated:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficient. Men born of freedom
186. See, Alternatives to Commitment, supra note 52, at 1151-53.
187. See note 178 supra.
188. Children who have physical handicaps, emotional problems, or other
problems such as enuresis are difficult to place. In fact, children who have
committed no sin greater than attaining school age have little chance of finding adoptive homes, and those who have reached their teens have virtually
none. 412 F. Supp. at 134-35.
189. Each of the named plaintiffs requested "an order of the court placing him in a
less drastic environment suitable to his needs." - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2498.
See also 412 F. Supp. at 139-40.
190. The Court made no reference in its opinion to the consideration of less drastic alternatives mandated by the district court beyond noting that "the court
*. . shifted its focus drastically from what was clearly a procedural due process analysis to what appears to be a substantive due process analysis. .. ."
- U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. at 2502. The Court's apparent perplexity is difficult to
understand in light of the number of cases involving the doctrine of the least
restrictive alternative in the context of civil commitment which were brought
to the Court's attention. Brief of the American Bar Assoc. Amicus Curiae at
23-24, Parham v. J.R., - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979).
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are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil minded rulers.
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious1 9encroachment
by men of
1
zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding.

James Herbsleb '80

191. Quoted in A. SUTHERLAND,

THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM

1967, 83 (1968).

